

Common access resource games with asymmetric players

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In recent years the characterization of time consistent solutions in dynamic optimization problems with non-standard time preferences as, for instance, hyperbolic and heterogeneous discounting, has also proven useful for studying time consistent solutions for cooperative differential games with asymmetric players. In this work we study a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource with N asymmetric players and obtain the Markov perfect equilibrium assuming partial cooperation between the agents in the coalition.

This is a joint work with Albert de-Paz and Jesús Marin-Solano.

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